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In 1949, NATO was established as a military alliance organized to protect its 
members from aggression or coercion by its adversaries to the East. However, 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the geostrategic context for NATO 
transformed significantly, with a new set of security threats (ethnic conflicts, 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, organized crime, etc.). For NATO to remain 
relevant, its members had to sustain its overall purpose of collective defense and 
contribute to collective security in the post-Cold War world, in which several 
internal and external factors have transformed. While the Alliance remains a 
collective defense organization, the Allies have nonetheless assumed additional 
roles in conflict prevention and crisis management. In its crisis management role, 
advances in military technology have afforded NATO the opportunity to utilize a 
significant strategic weapon, the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM). For 
NATO, the TLAM has demonstrated its utility for specific purposes; and it has 
transformed the landscape of modern warfare. This weapon has allowed NATO 
to enhance its force projection capability, while minimizing risks for Alliance 
personnel (aircrews and ground troops) when conducting strike operations.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the character of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) has transformed considerably. The NATO allies 
have undertaken a greater number of missions, and have operated in a larger 
geographical region in crisis management and conflict prevention. The 
enhancement of military technology has modified the way in which NATO 
conducts operations, and this has included the employment of long-range 
precision-guided munitions (PGMs).1 PGMs have become effective weapons for 
NATO, and continue to be an essential instrument, as seen in the 2011 Libya 
operations. Because of their versatility, PGMs have demonstrated their utility for 
specific purposes and have transformed the landscape of modern warfare in 
NATO operations. These new weapons have allowed NATO to enhance its force 
projection capability, while minimizing the loss of life (aircrews and ground 
troops) when conducting strike operations. The Vice President of the United 
States, Joseph R. Biden Jr., pointed out that the U.S. military “didn’t lose a single 
life” in the Libya operations and described the use of these new weapons as 
follows: “this is more of the prescription for how to deal with the world as we go 
forward than it has been in the past.”2  
Precision-guided munitions have been effective in attacking soft and hard 
targets, and have been reliable in preparing the battlefield. As newer generations 
of PGMs continue to be developed and integrated within NATO’s military posture, 
allies such as the United States and the United Kingdom will continue to utilize 
them. To what extent does this represent a new way of war for NATO? Have the 
                                            
1This thesis focuses on long-range cruise missiles. The term “PGM” is employed to refer to 
long-range cruise missiles, not to short-range PGMs such as anti-tank weapons and air-to-air 
missiles. 
2Joseph R. Biden Jr. quoted in Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Seeing Limits to ‘New Kind 




allies come to rely on long-range precision-strike cruise missiles for the 
suppression of enemy air defenses and other purposes? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Today, the complexity of modern warfare is changing, as advancements in 
military technology have afforded not only NATO, but also non-NATO countries, 
distinctive advantages in combat. PGMs and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
have, for example, changed the way in which war is fought, and have become a 
fundamental part of military postures worldwide. As Thomas G. Mahnken stated 
in Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945:  
On the battlefield of the future, enemy forces will be located, 
tracked, and targeted almost instantaneously through the use of 
data links, computer assisted intelligence evaluation and automated 
fire control. With first round probabilities approaching certainty, and 
with surveillance devices that can continually track the enemy, the 
need for large forces will be less important.3 
Today, the heavy emphasis placed on technology can be seen in the 
range of NATO operations conducted since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Technology has provided NATO not only the ability to respond effectively in crisis 
management and conflict prevention operations, but also the ability to gain a 
significant military advantage over its adversaries.  
C. PROBLEMS 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the purposes and identity 
of NATO have evolved. Since the early 1990s, the allies have conducted crisis 
management and conflict prevention actions outside the NATO collective 
defense area specified in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty of 1949.4 In 
interventions from Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995 to Operation 
                                            
3Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), 1. 
4Robert Owen, Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, Final Report of 
the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University 
Press, 2000), 65. 
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Unified Protector in Libya in 2011, the use of PGMs has been instrumental, 
specifically Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs). However, the utilization of 
this strategic weapon by NATO has raised two issues.  
The first issue is contextual: NATO adversaries are now acquiring them, 
too. In his article, “Cruise Missiles: Everyone’s Building Them,” John Reed 
states:  
It’s bad enough that the United States is losing its monopoly on 
drones, stealth technology, and advanced electronic warfare gear. 
But what makes matters worse is that America is also beginning to 
lose its edge on a particularly deadly and effective weapon, 
according to a new U.S. Air Force report: long-range ‘land attack’ 
cruise missiles.5  
The proliferation of these missiles promises to stimulate a costly 
competition in counter-measures.  
Second, in a time of economic crisis in which defense spending is being 
severely cut by most NATO allies, when only a few allies have been able to meet 
the defense budget goal of 2 percent of GDP, what priority will be given to the 
future development of these weapons? This question may be of grave concern 
for NATO, due to the pressures to eliminate certain national capabilities of 
specific allies. As of 2011, only five NATO allies were able to meet the 2 percent 
of GDP threshold: Albania (2.03), France (2.05), Greece (3.04), the United 
Kingdom (2.71), and the United States (4.68%).6  
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the NATO allies have relied to 
a significant degree on U.S.-built long-range precision-strike cruise missiles in 
their major interventions since 1995. It proposes to investigate this hypothesis by 
examining the characteristics of these missiles and the purposes that they have 
                                            
5John Reed, “Cruise Missiles: Everyone’s Building Them,” FP National Security, last 
accessed August 21, 2013, 
http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/11/cruise_missiles_everyones_building_them?w
p_login_redirect=0. 
6Kori Schake, “US Retrenchment is Right and Overdue,” in Tomas Valasek, ed. All Alone? 
What US Retrenchment Means for Europe and NATO (London: Centre for European Reform, 
2012), 8. 
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served in major interventions involving NATO allies. The thesis will then analyze 
the implications of the dependence of the NATO allies on these U.S.-built 
missiles. The analysis will examine the financial constraints affecting Allied 
defense spending and the ability of the allies to afford such missiles. This may 
affect the quantity of such missiles procured by the United Kingdom, the only 
non-U.S. NATO ally armed with TLAMs. Financial constraints may also affect the 
ability of other NATO allies to buy such missiles from the United States or to 
develop and produce such missiles themselves. The dependence on U.S. 
capabilities and technology may be all the more significant for the NATO allies in 
a context in which the United States has declared an intention to “pivot” to the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has provided 
security and freedom for its member countries. Throughout its post-Cold War 
history (that is, since 1989–1991), NATO has had distinct advantages in military 
technology when compared to its adversaries. In its 1995 intervention in the 
Bosnia conflict, Operation Deliberate Force, NATO took advantage of one 
particular advance in military technology: precision-guided munitions (PGMs). 
For NATO, PGMs have provided an instrumental capability for three crucial strike 
operations: Deliberate Force in 1995, Allied Force in 1999, and Unified Protector 
in 2011. Though numerous scholars have written on various aspects of these 
operations, this literature review will first focus on PGMs. In addition, the 
literature review will take into account the fact that the NATO Alliance is facing 
fiscal austerity and severe cuts in defense spending, which will influence its 
future capabilities. Finally, this literature review will consider the three NATO 
operations listed above.  
1. Precision-Guided Munitions 
In The Future of War: Power, Technology, and American World 
Dominance in the 21st Century, George and Meredith Friedman make several 
 5 
bold assertions in regard to the relationship between advanced technology 
(specifically PGMs) and potential warfare throughout the twenty-first century. By 
analyzing the transition from David’s sling (used to defeat Goliath) to the 
employment of PGMs, the authors provide critical facts and argue that future 
conflicts will be revolutionized due to advanced technology. The book is written 
only with respect to the United States; however, the revolution in weaponry is 
changing the nature of warfare worldwide. In respect to NATO, which can be 
seen as a U.S.-led Alliance, two long-range PGMs, the Tomahawk Land Attack 
Missile and the Air Launched Cruise Missile/Conventional Air Launched Cruise 
Missile, will probably continue to contribute to the success of potential NATO 
strike operations, as with previous ones. These missiles, in conjunction with other 
capabilities, enable NATO allies to achieve battlespace dominance, project 
power, and gain air superiority. The employment of “nine thousand bombs” to 
destroy a given target is now being supplanted by “one or two bombs” in today’s 
conflicts.7 As stated by the Friedmans, 
Precision-guided munitions made possible an economy of force 
never before seen in an air war. Where hundreds or thousands of 
bombs had been necessary to destroy a given target in the past, a 
small handful would now suffice. Where dozens or hundreds of 
aircraft would have been necessary to carry out attacks in the past, 
only two or three were now necessary.8  
Conceivably, as envisaged by the Friedmans in 1998, the age of ballistics 
is slowly drawing to an end, and the age of PGMs is with us now. The assertion 
made by the authors throughout the book, that PGMs will be the key factor in 
future conflicts, is reasonable. However, the authors fail to account for two major 
constraints on the future utility of PGMs. First, the financial limitations of the 
United States and other nations need to be addressed. Second, as PGM 
technology continues to advance, so do enemy counter-measures. In order to 
                                            
7George Friedman and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and 




critically analyze the future relevance of these strategic weapons, one must 
address the economic situation and potential enemy counter-measures. Without 
question, the employment of such weaponry has afforded NATO the opportunity 
to be more efficient than in previous operations; however, the future utility of 
PGMs may be constrained by financial and political factors as well as enemy 
counter-measures. In an era of mounting costs for advanced technology, these 
factors increase the challenges of using it.  
In Weapons of Choice: The Development of Precision Guided Munitions, 
Paul G. Gillespie analyzes the history and effects of precision-guided munitions 
since World War I. According to Gillespie, the analyses and insights provided by 
this significant body of work show overwhelming evidence that precision-guided 
munitions, “capable of producing far-reaching effects,” have transformed the way 
wars are conducted today and will be waged in the future.9 Gillespie contends 
that, “while a number of technologies were developed in the next half-century 
[that is, the next half century following World War II] to increase air power’s 
effectiveness, including improved cluster bombs, proximity fuses, penetrating 
warheads, napalm and other incendiaries, and stealth technology, nothing has 
revolutionized modern warfare in quite the same way as precision guidance.”10 
Moreover, he explains how the fabric of technology is built around social 
processes (including ethics and values), and how it would be “misleading to 
present it as the achievement of individual genius.”11 Gillespie’s book is concise 
and well written. He devotes considerable attention to the impact that precision-
guided munitions have had—and promise to have—on national security and 
military strategy worldwide.  
However, there are three major weaknesses in Gillespie’s work. First, he 
raises several questions and concerns, but offers little insight into the answers. 
                                            
9Paul G. Gillespie, Weapons of Choice: The Development of Precision Guided Munitions 




Second, his work sedulously focuses on one class of weapon, conventional 
bombs. He neglects other types of precision-guided munitions, such as long-
range cruise missiles. Third, Gillespie’s book has to be read with caution, as 
some of his observations are incorrect. For example, he describes the modern-
day cruise missile as lacking “flexibility in terms of in-flight retargeting … 
capability.”12 It is surprising to find this statement in a book published in 2006 
because even then it was publicly known that the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile 
(Echo) possessed this capability.  
Kenneth P. Werrell covers the evolution of a specific precision-guided 
munition in The Evolution of the Cruise Missile. Though this work is somewhat 
outdated (1985), it was one of the first studies to examine the evolution of these 
strategic weapons. It can be compared to the book edited by Richard Betts, 
Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics, and the book by Ronald Huisken, 
The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile, both published in 1981.13 Werrell 
analyzes the significant technological advances that have accrued over the last 
century for cruise missiles, and provides critical assessments. Werrell classes 
cruise missiles as one of the greatest technological advances since gunpowder, 
the “device … likely to revolutionize modern warfare,” or “the gun of the future.”14 
Additionally, this work addresses the political and “intraservice and interservice 
rivalry,” which surfaced during the Second World War in regard to the cruise 
missile.15 Werrell implies that this rivalry was a major factor complicating the 
development of this strategic weapon. Werrell’s work is concise and clear, and 
provides analytical depth and insight on the historical record of cruise missiles.  
 
 
                                            
12Ibid., 6. 
13Richard K. Betts, ed., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 1981); and Ronald Huisken, The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1981). 
14Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air 
University Press, 1985), 2. 
15Ibid., 79. 
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Nonetheless, technology has continued to advance since its publication, and the 
work does not fully cover today’s weaponry. Werrell offered the following 
prediction: 
Technology for the future generation cruise missile is also well 
advanced. At this time the key areas appear to be electronics, 
engines, and fuels. These promise to produce reliable and 
markedly improved performance in short order. Therefore, these 
next generation cruise missiles should maintain the lead the 
present ones enjoy over current enemy air defenses. This prospect 
of continued technological superiority ensures that the cruise 
missile will be vital to American security in the foreseeable future.16 
The work is better suited for the novice interested in the basic 
characteristics and history of this weapon, and not so much for the experienced 
reader, as it lacks the details necessary in an account for specialists. 
Werrell’s Chasing the Silver Bullet: U.S. Air Force Weapons Development 
from Vietnam to Desert Storm analyzes the development of Air Force technology 
from the mid-1960s through the early 1990s. In examining this complex and often 
controversial subject, Werrell discusses many aspects of Air Force technology. 
Drawing on his Air Force service, Werrell provides an exceptional personal 
perspective on the development and success of Air Force weaponry, ranging 
from the F-105 fighter-bomber to precision-guided munitions. He describes the 
evolution of this weaponry as being “more than a function of the rich financial, 
industrial, and intellectual resources of American society,” and attributes its 
success to those “dedicated and talented individuals in industry and the military 
[who] were responsible for the technology that emerged to help make America 
the undisputed air power and military power in the world.”17  
Additionally, Werrell shows how innovation has changed the content of 
warfare, declaring that “For many, technology is the panacea, America’s trump 
                                            
16Ibid., 212.  
17Kenneth P. Werrell, Chasing the Silver Bullet: U.S. Air Force Weapons Development from 
Vietnam to Desert Storm (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2003), 2. 
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card.”18 Werrell remains unbiased throughout his work, pointing out how war 
consists of much more than technology, and how technology alone cannot win 
wars. As the technology of today’s adversaries has the potential of being fairly 
equivalent to U.S. technology, one should not overemphasize the importance of 
technology. Though seventy percent of his work relates to aircraft, Werrell 
provides an exceptionally useful overview of U.S. Air Force technology following 
World War II. Werrell’s wealth of knowledge not only sheds considerable light on 
the weapons themselves, but also on the influence of political involvement.  
2. Operation Deliberate Force 
In Deliberate Force: NATO’s First Extended Air Operation, David L. 
Dittmer and Stephen P. Dawkins provide a chronological account of the air 
operations in Operation Deliberate Force (ODF) and address the crucial 
elements (such as a revised understanding of command and control between the 
UN and NATO, and superior leadership) which brought success to the Alliance in 
ODF. The authors suggest that the trigger for NATO air operations resulted from 
“a series of brutal offensives by the Bosnian Serb Army against the UN safe 
areas,” including Sarajevo.19 The authors note that the Sarajevo offensives were 
“portrayed in color on CNN worldwide,” and hold that “the compelling force of 
world public opinion” required the use of decisive military force by NATO.20 
Considered NATO’s first extended air operation, Deliberate Force involved the 
decisive use of airpower, and precision airstrikes played a critical element in 
support of Allied diplomacy.  
Moreover, Dittner and Dawkins were analytical in their approach toward 
the dilemmas presented to both the political leaders and the coalition forces 
(including those in the UN and NATO), as each party regarded the operational 
employment of airpower differently. The authors emphasize the airpower 
                                            
18Ibid. 
19David L. Dittmer and Stephen P. Dawkins, Deliberate Force: NATO’s First Extended Air 
Operation: The View from AFSOUTH (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 1998), 2. 
20Ibid. 
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involved in ODF, and consequently at times the reader seems to receive the 
message that airpower was the only decisive factor in ODF, which would be a 
somewhat misleading impression. Airpower demonstrated a certain degree of 
political will, but other key factors of importance, such as economic sanctions and 
the role of the political arena, had an imposing influence. As one of the first 
military operations undertaken by NATO, in which a “shift from a UN military 
peacekeeping operation to a NATO peace-enforcement operation” was 
witnessed, a number of key factors were relevant throughout this operation.21  
Robert C. Owen and his co-authors captured the planning, execution, and 
results of Operation Deliberate Force in Deliberate Force: A Case Study in 
Effective Air Campaigning. This work provides future leaders an in depth 
understanding of the use of airpower and the significance it will provide for future 
foreign policy. By thoroughly examining key geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, 
technological, and operational factors, the authors showed that the utilization of 
airpower delivered what it promised in ODF. Airpower served as a “decisive 
element in bringing a new period of peace to Bosnia—quickly, cleanly, and at a 
minimal cost in blood and treasure to the intervening states and, indeed, to the 
Bosnian Serbs.”22 Additionally, this fundamental study illuminates the importance 
of the political-military environment for future operations. The authors hold that 
one foundation for success resides in the political-military structure between the 
UN and NATO. Despite the somewhat “tenuous” relationship between the UN 
and NATO, the operation “highlighted the ability of separate political and military 
organizations to work together.”23 This study concluded that the successful use 
of airpower would be central to the relationship between political authorities and 
the military.  
Michael O. Beale addresses the political and historical context of 
Operation Deny Flight and Operation Deliberate Force in Bombs Over Bosnia: 
                                            
21Ibid., 47. Italics in the original. 
22Owen, Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, 515.  
23Ibid., 60.  
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The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina.24 While Beale acknowledges the 
pivotal role that airpower played within the broader Yugoslav War, he is quick to 
point out that it was not the most decisive factor, nor did it bring an end to the war 
itself. According to Beale, “Factors equal in importance to airpower were the role 
international and domestic politics played, the difficulty of forging an acceptable 
military option agreeable to both the UN and NATO, economic sanctions against 
the former Yugoslavia, and the growing military superiority of the Bosnian/Croat 
Confederation.”25 Beale deems economic sanctions the most decisive factor in 
the Yugoslav War, due to the immeasurable pressures on Milosevic and his 
regime. Beale offers insights about both Operation Deny Flight and Operation 
Deliberate Force. He covers the many advantages of airpower, as well as its 
limitations. He concludes that “airpower without political consensus in a hostile 
environment can be more of a liability than an asset.”26 Thanks largely to 
developments in the economic and political arenas, Operation Deny Flight and 
Operation Deliberate Force were conducted in a favorable environment for 
airpower to be successful.  
3. Operation Allied Force 
In NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, 
Benjamin S. Lambeth analyzes and summarizes the key events and lessons 
learned from Operation Allied Force (OAF). By analyzing NATO’s 78-day air war, 
Lambeth captured the essence of the operation’s strengths and weaknesses. As 
Lambeth observed, OAF “represented the first extended use of military force by 
NATO, as well as the first major combat operation conducted for humanitarian 
objectives against a state committing atrocities within its own borders.”27 He 
wrote, “NATO’s leaders remained blind to the fact that air power’s very strengths 
                                            
24Michael O. Beale, Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1997). 
25Ibid., 43. 
26Ibid., 47. 
27Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational 
Assessment (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), 219.  
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can become weaknesses if the air weapon is used in a way that undermines its 
credibility.”28 He emphasized this point by describing the persistent 
disagreements among the leaders of NATO, including France and the United 
States, and their contradictory views on how allied air power should be utilized 
against the forces of Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, he noted this discord among the Alliance’s leaders 
led to its failure to capitalize on NATO’s air power potential.29 Additionally, 
Lambeth and many other scholars have cautioned those who believe that 
Milosevic was bombed into submission by this 78-day air war, and have pointed 
out that other contributing factors should be taken into account, such as the 
threat of an invasion by ground troops.30 A senior research associate for the 
RAND Corporation, Lambeth provides an exceptional body of knowledge in 
regard to the airpower used in Kosovo. His report raises several questions, with 
implications for the continuing debate over the role of airpower in Operation 
Allied Force.  
The Department of Defense’s Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action 
Report to the Congress examines with a critical eye the overwhelming success 
and the many minor shortcomings of Operation Allied Force. In addition to 
highlighting the important lessons learned, the report identifies the cornerstone of 
OAF, NATO’s precision strike capability. The report describes OAF as 
“undoubtedly the most precise air and missile combat in [NATO’s] history,” and 
implies that, due to the success of PGMs, future operations will be similar.31 The 
                                            
28Ibid., 231. 
29Ibid., 185. 
30Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,” 
International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000); Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-
Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo (Westport: Praeger, 2001); Ivo H. Daalder 
and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 2000); Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2001); and Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the 
Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). 
31Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 31 January 2000), xxiii. 
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report highlights the unprecedented advantages of employing Tomahawks and 
other PGMs as strategic weapons: minimizing the loss of personnel and 
decreasing the chances of damaging unintended targets. The report also 
acknowledges the shortcomings of these weapons: they are not as effective 
against moving targets as against fixed targets, and they are also vulnerable to 
jamming. Despite the overwhelming success of OAF, the report revealed a major 
disparity within the Alliance, the capabilities gap between the United States and 
the other allies. In short, as NATO continues to operate in its crisis management 
role, the capabilities gap within the Alliance will have a serious effect upon its 
capacity to deal with twenty-first century threats. In light of declining defense 
budgets, these disparities may even widen.  
In Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, 
retired General Wesley K. Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe as 
well as the U.S. European Command Commander, provides a personal 
perspective on Operation Allied Force. Due to his personal involvement, Clark 
offers a unique insight into the fundamental differences (political involvement, 
command and control, etc.) among Alliance members while conducting OAF. 
According to Clark, “The United States was increasingly committed to the idea of 
strategic strikes, going after the heart of Milosevic’s power. The Europeans, or at 
least the French and a few others, were more interested in limiting the strikes to 
Kosovo.”32 These fundamental differences developed into a “dichotomy between 
political aims and military means.”33 Because Clark heavily emphasizes the 
political side of OAF, he does not provide a thorough analysis of the operation 
itself. Nonetheless, Clark’s unique personal perspective sheds considerable light 
on issues that continue to face NATO, and that could be seen in Operation 
Unified Protector in Libya in 2011.  
                                            
32Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2001), 237.  
33Ibid., 244. 
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In Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999, Bruce R. Naradulli 
and his co-authors examine a host of issues surrounding Operation Allied Force. 
Naradulli and his co-authors hold that these issues “caused confusion, probably 
made the operation less effective than it could have been, and possibly delayed 
victory.”34 Naradulli and his co-authors make clear that decision-makers need to 
evaluate the issues that arose during OAF, and also to consider these issues as 
part of an ongoing effort to enhance NATO for future operations. Additionally, the 
lack of political and military cohesion visible in OAF continues to highlight the 
disparities in capabilities between the United States and other NATO members. 
The authors stress that future operations are “likely to be characterized by 
conflicts in which political imperatives call for the United States to act as part of a 
larger political-military alliance or coalition.”35 Nonetheless, despite the many 
divisive pressures faced by the NATO allies, their determination and ability 
afforded a clear victory in OAF. As acknowledged by the authors, much material, 
specifically that concerning tactics and weapons performance, was omitted from 
this book. This important information might have enhanced understanding of the 
role that airpower played in OAF.  
Stephen T. Hosmer, in The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided 
to Settle When He Did, weighs and analyzes the various reasons why Milosevic 
initially refused to concede to NATO’s demands and why he eventually chose not 
to continue the war. Hosmer argues that the use of airpower created a political 
climate conducive to major concessions, caused worry in the regime over 
damage to “dual-use” infrastructures, and deepened fear of unconstrained 
bombing on Serbia if NATO’s terms were rejected. In Hosmer’s view, these 
factors “appear to have shaped Milosevic’s decisionmaking” in conceding in early 
June of 1999. 36  
                                            
34Bruce R. Nardulli et al., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999 (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002), xiii. 
35Ibid., 121. 
36Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He 
Did (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 1, 65.  
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The analysis and insights suggested by Hosmer provide two valuable 
lessons for NATO and the United States in regard to the use of air power in 
future conflicts. First, the NATO allies must improve weapon systems that are 
capable of attacking dispersed and hidden forces. Second, the NATO allies 
should preserve the capability of attacking dual-use targets.37 It can be assumed, 
as predicted by Hosner, that future conflicts (as in Operation Unified Protector) 
will be conducted with similar operational objectives. Understanding these 
lessons is critical for operational success in future conflicts.  
4. Operation Unified Protector 
Erica D. Borghard and Costantino Pischedda, in “Allies and Airpower in 
Libya,” explain in detail the way in which the “Afghan model (synergy of precision 
airstrikes and local allies fighting on the ground) “ was a success in Operation 
Unified Protector (OUP), and may serve as a template for future operations.38 
Additionally, Borghard and Pischedda provide a telling example of how 
Muammar Qaddafi’s regime was overthrown without the assistance of NATO 
land forces. In their analysis, the utilization of both airpower and local allies was 
systematically stressed. In view of the effective relationship between airpower 
and local allies in OUP, Borghard and Pischedda suggest that future NATO 
operations will rely heavily on air power, and look to local allies for ground 
support.  
With conclusions similar to those of the previous authors, Ivo H. Daalder 
and James G. Stavridis, in “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an 
Intervention,” hail Operation Unified Protector as a successful intervention, a 
blueprint for future operations. Daalder and Stavridis argue that OUP 
demonstrated the Alliance’s effectiveness; nonetheless, they observe, the 
                                            
37Ibid., 132–133. 
38Erica D. Borghard and Costantino Pischedda, “Allies and Airpower in Libya,” Parameters 
XLIII (Spring 2012), 63. 
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challenges in both conception and execution need to be addressed.39 The 
authors hold that NATO faced two major challenges, the heavy reliance on the 
United States and the shortcomings in political unity within the Alliance. If the 
allies fail to meet these challenges, given the context of shrinking defense 
spending, “NATO may not be able to replicate its success in Libya in another 
decade.”40 Deep-rooted challenges (including excessive reliance on the United 
States and capability gaps within the Alliance) have affected NATO since its 
inception.  
Unlike the two previous works (which support the utilization of airpower 
and local ground troops), in “Libya’s Lessons: The Air Campaign,” Douglas Barrie 
argues against the reliance on airpower and local ground troops. Barrie 
acknowledges the vital role that air power played in OUP. In his view, “such 
operations, however, where air power is used to support local boots on the 
ground, should not be the default model for future interventions.”41 Additionally, 
Barrie points out a parallel between the length of the operation and the reduction 
of weapon inventories, specifically precision-guided munitions. Barrie provides 
adequate information to support his judgments. He nonetheless falls short of 
persuading the reader that NATO’s involvement in future operations will not 
mirror the pattern of Operation Unified Protector. The economic crisis—and 
constrained defense budgets—will further promote the utilization of these critical 
capabilities (airpower and the support of local ground forces), as military 
deficiencies (such as aerial refueling and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities) will continue to be significant.  
In their monograph, Winning in Libya: By Design or Default?, Michael W. 
Kometer and Stephen E. Wright raise a controversial question. Was the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate, which authorized the use of “all 
                                            
39Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an 
Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (March -April 2012), 3. 
40Ibid., 7. 
41Douglas Barrie, “Libya’s Lessons: The Air Campaign,” Survival 54, no. 6 (December 2012–
January 2013), 64. 
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necessary measures” to protect citizens from armed attacks, coupled with the 
implementation of an arms embargo and a no-fly zone, exceeded with the 
capture and killing of Qaddafi?42 In a comprehensive study, the authors 
demonstrate how unclear UN objectives on end states led to “a lack of clear 
political guidance at the strategic level, which often translated into somewhat 
inconsistent military planning at the operational level.”43 Yet, despite these 
circumstances, the authors emphasize that OUP was successful due to the 
impact of airpower. Airpower aided NATO in ensuring the achievement of the 
UNSC mandate by preventing a humanitarian catastrophe, and thus protecting 
the citizens of Libya. Kometer and Wright hold that “the 2011 civil war in Libya 
provides a case study that delivers many perspectives and lessons for strategists 
and planners, especially for the air component.”44  
At first sight, the result of Operation Unified Protector suggests that future 
operations will be fought in the same fashion. However, in the collection of 
papers entitled Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of 
the 2011 Libya Campaign, Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen argue that OUP 
will be remembered more as “a one-off case than as a model” for future 
interventions.45 The critical insights offered by this collection of papers provide 
grounds to believe that future operations will not mirror those of OUP, regardless 
of its successful outcome. According to Michael Clarke, OUP “could easily have 
been a politico-military embarrassment to Britain and its allies.”46 The analyses 
provided by the contributors to this collection highlight critical problems, including 
                                            
42Michael W. Kometer and Stephen E. Wright, Winning in Libya: By Design or Default? 
Focus Stratégique no. 41 (Paris: Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des 
Relations Internationales, January 2013), 13. 
43Ibid., 5. 
44Ibid., 39. 
45Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen, eds., “Introduction,” Short War, Long Shadow: The 
Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign (London: Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2012), 5. 
46Michael Clarke, “The Making of Britain’s Libya Strategy,” in Adrian Johnson and Saqeb 
Mueen, eds., “Introduction,” Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 
2011 Libya Campaign (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 
2012), 12. 
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the process by which strategic decisions were made within the Alliance, 
capability gaps within the Alliance, and the divisions among the allies. These 
divisions were apparent with Germany’s and Turkey’s initial decisions not to 
participate in the operation. (Turkey changed course and participated in OUP.) In 
sum, the collection of papers offers a broad overview of OUP. An operation 
originally intended to prevent a humanitarian disaster became the context of a 
controversial regime change.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will analyze the functions in NATO operations of PGMs, and 
explore the possible utility of these weapons in potential future NATO operations. 
The thesis will examine three strike operations in which these strategic weapons 
were used and the outcome of those operations: 
 Operation Deliberate Force (Bosnia Campaign). On August 30, 
1995, NATO initiated Operation Deliberate Force (an assertive air 
campaign), which relied on precision strikes against selected 
targets in Serb-held Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operation Deliberate 
Force could be considered the first large-scale mission that aided 
NATO in defining its new roles in crisis management and conflict 
prevention.  
 Operation Allied Force (Kosovo Campaign). After the failure of 
diplomatic attempts to end the violence, repression, and violations 
of human rights ordered by the government of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY) and its elected president, Slobodan Milosevic, 
on March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, which 
included precision strikes against many high-priority targets in the 
FRY.  
 Operation Unified Protector (Libya Campaign). On March 19, 2011, 
NATO forces (from France, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) launched a campaign of air and cruise missile strikes 
against targets in Libya, in support of United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. This would become the 
biggest intervention in an Arab country since the 2003 Iraq War. 
The aforementioned operations will be evaluated because they were the only 
operations in which long-range PGMs were used. Moreover, this thesis will rely 
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heavily on after-action reviews and primary sources, as well as scholarly books, 
military studies, and academic journals.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis analyzes the functions in NATO operations of long-range 
PGMs, and explores the possible future utility of these weapons for NATO 
operations in the ever-changing security environment. The thesis is organized 
into six chapters. Chapter I presents the major research question and highlights 
the importance of this study, while discussing the various sources used. Chapter 
II studies the evolution of the cruise missile and discusses in detail one particular 
cruise missile, the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. Chapter III focuses on three 
defining NATO operations: Operation Deliberate Force, Operation Allied Force, 
and Operation Unified Protector. These cases are evaluated because they 
provide telling examples of why precision-guided munitions have become a 
weapon of choice for the Alliance in potential future operations. Chapter IV 
focuses on the operational capabilities gap between the United States and its 
NATO allies, and its possible significance for future operations. Chapter V shows 
how the operational success of cruise missiles has attracted attention around the 
world, and discusses the challenges it presents in the foreseeable future. Lastly, 
Chapter VI offers conclusions and recommendations for NATO concerning the 
future utility of cruise missiles.  
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II. LONG-RANGE PRECISION-STRIKE CRUISE MISSILES IN 
NATO OPERATIONS 
A. DEFINITION OF A CRUISE MISSILE 
What is a cruise missile? There are differing views about the true definition 
of a cruise missile. However, in simple terms, a cruise missile “is simply a 
miniature, self-guided, unmanned, armed, one-way aircraft, which is dependent 
on air for lift and as a source of oxygen.”47 According to an official definition, “a 
cruise missile is a guided missile, the major portion of whose flight path to its 
target is conducted at approximately constant velocity; [it] depends on the 
dynamic reaction of air for lift and upon propulsion forces to balance drag.”48 This 
definition includes unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, as well as altered 
vehicles capable of carrying a warhead on a single flight. For decades, cruise 
missiles have been seen as the weapon of choice for not only NATO, but other 
military organizations as well.  
Cruise missiles are small and able to fly close to the ground. This reduces 
their radar cross-section and allows them to hide behind hills and the curvature of 
the earth, making them much harder to detect and defeat. As stated by Ronald 
Huisken, “Because it is subsonic and cannot do anything but what it is 
programmed to do, the survivability of the cruise missile depends critically on it 
remaining undetected until it is too late for the defenses to react.”49 This 
capability has on some occasions enabled U.S. and NATO forces to gain 
complete domination of the battle space, which is a critical component for 
operational success. Cruise missiles have therefore revolutionized modern 
warfare.  
                                            
47Kenneth P. Werrell, “The Weapon the Military Did Not Want: The Modern Strategic Cruise 
Missile,” The Journal of Military History 53, no.4 (Oct., 1989), 420. 
48Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 1998, 
118. 
49Ronald Huisken, The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1981), 5. 
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B. THE ORIGINS OF CRUISE MISSILES 
While weapons come and go in the military, history provides 
examples of classes of weapons having both a dramatic and a 
lasting impact upon the conduct of warfare.50 
Since their inception, cruise missiles have been hailed as one of the 
greatest technological advances since gunpowder. As stated in The Evolution of 
the Cruise Missile, by Kenneth P. Werrell, “Except for gunpowder and [the] 
atomic bomb, no weapon has threatened a greater effect on war and peace than 
the cruise missile.”51 This sophisticated weapon has revolutionized the conduct 
of modern warfare.  
The concept of cruise missiles (known as “flying bombs” and “aerial 
torpedos” in their earlier life) can be traced back to the first World War, in which 
attempts were made by two inventors, Peter C. Hewitt (inventor of the mercury 
vapor lamp) and Elmer A. Sperry (of Sperry Gyroscope Company), to pioneer 
such devices for inclusion in the U.S. military arsenal.52 Thanks to both inventors, 
great promise would be demonstrated in the design and testing of these devices 
in the summer of 1916. Nonetheless, despite this seemingly great promise, there 
were numerous failures, and the cruise missile for the United States would not 
see life before Germany’s employment of the V-1 (the Vergeltungswaffen Eins) 
cruise missile in World War II.  
On June 13, 1944, it was estimated that Germany had employed over 
10,000 V-1 cruise missiles against the United Kingdom in World War II.53 
According to Werrell, “The V-I … ushered in a new type of warfare consisting of 
remote bombing of cities by pilotless weapons launched over a hundred miles 
away through all kinds of weather, day and night.”54 Moreover, the German class 
                                            
50Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile, 1.  
51Ibid., 2. 
52Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile, 7.  
53Huisken, The Origin of the Strategic Cruise Missile, 15. 
54Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile, 41. 
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of cruise missile featured a number of other advantages. First, it was fairly cheap 
to build, and it could therefore be available via mass production, as seen in World 
War II Germany. It was estimated that in all, Germany produced close to 30,000 
“V” variant cruise missiles in World War II.55 Moreover, due to their unique flight 
profile (high speed and low altitude approach), German cruise missiles were 
difficult to detect and intercept. Lastly, launch personnel were not put at risk. 
Conversely, the V-1 had a number of disadvantages. As Richard K. Betts has 
observed, “At first it was quite effective, but because the technology was crude—
the V-1 was large and slow and flew at relatively high altitudes … defenses were 
able to adapt and eventually destroyed the bulk of the missiles before they could 
reach their targets.”56 It was estimated that over eighty percent of Germany’s 
cruise missiles were launched from ramps, with over twenty percent crashing at 
launch, and with adversaries shooting down over fifty percent of those remaining 
while in flight.57  
By the 1950s, building on the German concept, the United States quickly 
emulated and started several cruise missile programs. In an attempt to surmount 
the shortcomings of the V-1, the United States committed its efforts to the 
guidance and launching element of this weapon. With the help of recovered 
German V-1 parts, the United States was able to design a variety of cruise 
missiles that had great potential, including: 
1. Navaho, a ramjet-propelled cruise missile that was a small, light-
weight system, guided to its target by inertial guidance. 
2. Snark, a cruise missile of intercontinental range that, by means of 
inertial guidance, could achieve a circular error probability (CEP) of 
under five nautical miles. 
                                            
55Ibid., 61. 
56Richard K. Betts, Cruise Missiles and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1982), 4. 
57Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile, 61. 
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3. Mace, a nuclear–armed subsonic cruise missile, which could fly to 
a range of 600 nautical miles by employing an early form of terrain 
correlation, map-matching. 
4. Hounddog, another nuclear-armed air-to-surface cruise missile, 
designed as a bomber penetration aid. 
5. Talos, an air-defense cruise missile.58  
Despite the vast improvements, however, these and other first-generation 
cruise missiles continued to present major weaknesses. As highlighted by 
Werrell, they “had continued problems of reliability, accuracy, and vulnerability 
and could not compete with ballistic missiles which had distinct advantages.”59 
Because these disadvantages outweighed the many advantages, the United 
States dedicated little effort to cruise missile technology throughout the 1960s, 
thereby postponing cruise missile development until the 1970s. As Werrell notes, 
“there were, to be sure, a number of small programs in both the Air Force and 
Navy working on cruise missile technology, but these were not intended to 
produce a strategic cruise missile.”60 
Not until the 1970s, owing in part to advancing technology in warheads 
(specifically nuclear), turbofan engines, fuels, materials, and terrain contour-
matching (TERCOM) navigation systems, would the development of the modern 
cruise missile begin. As stated by Betts, “What transformed the neglected cruise 
missile into an important part of defense program was an uncoordinated 
evolution of technological innovations rather than a deliberate effort or an 
epochal breakthrough.”61 Advancing technology assisted in transforming the 
once large, unpredictable, and inaccurate cruise missiles of the past century into 
a new type of weapon that would have a dramatic and enduring effect on the 
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conduct of warfare to the present day. With improvements in its performance, the 
cruise missile’s prominence grew, and political factors became more relevant in 
the 1970s. Throughout the 1970s, support for the cruise missile intensified, as 
top officials for DOD, “especially Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements, 
were enthusiastic about the weapon.”62 This newfound attention to cruise 
missiles would merge the efforts of the United States Navy (USN) and United 
States Air Force (USAF). Due to the seemingly parallel programs of the two 
military services in cruise missile development, a designated joint system 
acquisition effort was formed, and became known as the Joint Cruise Missiles 
Project Office (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  JCMPO Organizational Structure63 
                                            
62Werrell, “The Weapon the Military Did Not Want,” 424. 
63E. H. Conrow et al., The Joint Cruise Missiles Project: An Acquisition History (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 1982), 10. 
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Originally, to counter and deter Soviet aggression, the U.S. cruise missile 
program focused on the option of developing a submarine-launched nuclear 
weapon delivery vehicle. As highlighted by Betts, “The most obvious contribution 
of cruise missiles to the U.S. force posture is in essential equivalence” to that of 
the Soviet Union.64 However, under the direction of the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD) in the early 1970s, the program would develop into a wider range 
of weapons and launch methods, in which the development of two long-range 
precision strike cruise missiles would come into fruition. This new joint venture 
directed the “Air Force to share its turbofan engine and high-energy fuel with the 
Navy, and the Navy to share [its] TERCOM with the Air Force,” leading to a 
common development program that is significant today.65 This encouragement 
and promotion of technology sharing between the Air Force and the Navy would 
go on to foster a “full-scale engineering development [for] an air-launched, anti-
surface, theater, nuclear” cruise missile.66 Today, both the Air Force and the 
Navy continue to be heavily involved in cruise missile program management, and 
this joint partnership continues to enable the cruise missile to grow in significance 
as a potent weapon. The outcome of this partnership was significant in the 
development of two strategic weapons accessible for the NATO Alliance, 
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile and the Air Launched Cruise 
Missile/Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile.  
C. THE TOMAHAWK LAND ATTACK MISSILE 
In several NATO precision strike operations, the Tomahawk Land Attack 
Missile (TLAM) was the weapon of choice (Figure 2). Since 1995, TLAMs have 
provided the Alliance a formidable tool against adversaries, as seen in three 
major operations—Operation Deliberate Force (ODF), Operation Allied Force 
(OAF), and Operation Unified Protector (OUP). Since the initial use of TLAMs in 
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65Ibid.  
66Janes, “Tomahawk Land Attack Missile,” HIS, last accessed September 5, 2013, 
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ODF, approximately 435 TLAMs have been employed in NATO operations. 
Although only in the hands of the United States and the United Kingdom (which 
can launch only from Royal Navy submarines), this strategic weapon has 
provided NATO greater force projection capability, without putting Alliance 
personnel (aircrews and ground troops) at risk.67 It is estimated that close to 
3,500 Tomahawk missiles have been manufactured, whereas 2,000 have been 
employed in various operations.68 
 
Figure 2.  Tomahawk Land Attack Missile69 
The development of the TLAM can be tracked back to the late 1960s, 
when it was originally devised as a submarine-launched weapon delivery vehicle. 
Not until 1972 would the development of TLAM lead to a surface-launched 
weapon delivery vehicle. The United States Navy made it a priority to have a 
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“ship- and submarine-launch capability for attacking ships and land targets; 
primarily in the early days with nuclear warheads, to provide an additional 
survivable nuclear force.”70 After years of development, the TLAM ultimately saw 
its first submarine-launch in 1979 and its first surface-launch in 1980. However, 
not until 1983 was the TLAM entered into service and deployed on its first naval 
platform (Los Angeles Class Fast-attack Submarine). Nevertheless, it would not 
experience its first operational use until the first Gulf War, in which 291 
Tomahawks would be fired.71 Since then, the TLAM has been employed 
successfully in several precision strike operations, not only for the Alliance, but 
also in U.S.-led coalition operations as well (e.g., Operation Enduring Freedom).  
Today, we commonly refer to the TLAM as a conventionally armed, long 
range, all-weather, subsonic, cruise missile capable of a low-profile, multi-
segmented flight. Since its inception, this strategic weapon has gone through an 
assortment of variants. Originally, the TLAM consisted of the TLAM-N (RGM-
109A), a nuclear warhead missile; and the TASM (RGM-109B), a conventional 
high explosive (HE) warhead anti-ship missile. Since then, three variants have 
been added to the Tomahawk family: the TLAM-C (RGM-109C), a conventional 
HE warhead missile; the TLAM-D (RGM-109D), a conventional submunition 
warhead missile; and lastly, the TLAM-E (RGM-109E), a conventional HE 
warhead missile. Today, the Tomahawk family consists of four variants: three 
conventional warheads and one nuclear warhead (Table 1). Depending on the 
variant, these strategic weapons possess the capability of traveling at speeds 
exceeding 500 knots (subsonic speed) between 700 nautical miles (NM) to 1,400 
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Table 1.   Current Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles72 
1. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile “A” Variant 
The TLAM-N is the first and only nuclear-armed missile of the Tomahawk 
family (Figure 3). With a W80 nuclear warhead, the TLAM-N was designed “as 
another dimension to strengthen deterrence” against Soviet aggression during 
the Cold War era.73 In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United 
States announced the retirement of the TLAM-N.74  
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Figure 3.  Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-N)75 
2. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile “C” Variant 
The TLAM-C (Figure 4) delivers a conventional 1,000-pound warhead 
designed to destroy or damage large hard targets (buildings, bases, etc.). It has 
the capability to travel up to 1,000 nautical miles. According to the website 
Missile Threat, the most recent upgrade was completed in 1986, and this 
introduced the digital scene matching area correlation (DSMAC) navigation 
system, designed for the TLAM-C and TLAM-D versions.76 Today, the current 
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TLAM-C inventory is being upgraded to possess Block IV capability, which will 
increase flexibility and operational control.77  
 
Figure 4.  Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-C)78 
3. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile “D” Variant 
The TLAM-D (Figure 5) delivers Combined Effects Bomblets (CEB) sub-
munitions (166 small armor piercing, fragmentation, and incendiary devices), and 
it has the capability of traveling up to 700 nautical miles. TLAM-D possesses the 
same guidance and accuracy capability as the TLAM-C, but differs in that it is 
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designed to strike softer targets (airfields, troop concentrations, air defenses, 
etc.). The TLAM-D is capable of flying horizontally, vertically, and overhead (to 
detonate directly over the target).79 As with the TLAM-C, the TLAM-D inventory is 
being upgraded to possess Block IV capability.80  
 
Figure 5.  Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-D)81 
4. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile “E” Variant 
The latest member of the Tomahawk family, the TLAM-E (Figure 6), also 
called the “tactical Tomahawk,” is an entirely redesigned missile.82 A much-
improved variant, this missile possesses several unique capabilities superior to 
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those of the preceding variants: an increased range, an improved anti-jamming 
GPS system, and an enhanced battle damage assessment capacity. Moreover, 
unlike the TLAM-C and TLAM-D, which are “fire and forget” missiles, the TLAM-E 
is capable of changing targets and flight profiles after launch. Additionally, it has 
the capability of traveling up to 1,400 nautical miles.83 The TLAM-E “was 
designed to maintain the high accuracy of previous versions, while increasing the 
flexibility and operational control.”84 Currently, the TLAM-E is the only version 
being produced. For the remaining variants, it is reported that they have been or 
will be converted to block IV missiles.85  
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Figure 6.  Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-E)86 
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III. NATO OPERATIONS IN WHICH CRUISE MISSILES HAVE 
BEEN EMPLOYED 
A. OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE (BOSNIA CAMPAIGN) 
On August 30, 1995, following a series of mortar attacks by the Bosnian 
Serb Army (BSA) that resulted in a heavy loss of life (killing 38 civilians and 
injuring 85 others) in Sarajevo (an UN-designated safe area), NATO initiated 
Operation Deliberate Force (an extended air campaign) by launching precision 
strikes upon many high-priority targets in Serb-held Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
This operation served as a defining moment in NATO’s history. It aided in 
clarifying NATO’s new roles in not only peacekeeping, but also crisis 
management and conflict prevention for major out-of-area operations in the post-
Cold War era. The ability to “go beyond collective defense and to conduct new 
security missions” enabled NATO to remain relevant in this new era.87 It was 
believed by both “NATO supporters and NATO critics…that the Alliance would 
have to go ‘out of area’ or it would go ‘out of business.’”88 
From August 30 through September 20, 1995, ODF would come to 
represent the most forceful use of military power to date by NATO. Under the 
leadership of Admiral Leighton W. Smith, ODF was comprised of 16 nations, 
totaling over 5,000 personnel. For two-and-a-half weeks, NATO orchestrated “an 
air campaign designed to coerce Serbia into negotiating an end to the civil war” 
and lifting the siege of Sarajevo.89 Furthermore, in conjunction with the ongoing 
Operation Deny Flight, NATO employed a total of thirteen TLAMs, causing 
substantial damage to key Serb infrastructures (communication suites, air  
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defenses, radars, armors, etc.).90 Thus, the precision strikes were conducted 
with a limited number of cruise missiles; they nonetheless played a significant 
role in bringing a resolution to the situation.  
To understand the true significance of ODF, one must look at the decline 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. Understanding this 
complex history helps in highlighting the critical causes that brought about “the 
death of Yugoslavia” and NATO’s decision to conduct ODF. Throughout the early 
1990s, because of ethnic tensions, economic decline, and false claims and 
promises made by Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the successor states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
became engulfed in a civil war and inter-state wars. Furthermore, tensions 
elevated because of the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 
1991. By the spring of 1992, six other nations surrounding Bosnia had declared 
independence. This turmoil contributed to the ongoing violence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. As these newly independent nations sought to acquire more 
Bosnian territory, this only compounded the ethnic tension that left Yugoslavia in 
a precarious position throughout the early 1990s. In response to the prolonged 
fighting that resulted in a heavy loss of life, the United Nations inserted a 
protection force (UNPROFOR), which implemented a series of unsuccessful 
cease-fire agreements with Milosevic and his forces. The resolution mandated 
that UNPROFOR provide security and humanitarian aid for refugees until the end 
of the Bosnian war. However, UNPROFOR and the cease-fire agreements were 
not enough to defuse the situation. Serbian forces acting under the orders of 
Milosevic performed widespread ethnic cleansing throughout Bosnia, “creating 
horrific scenes of refugees and concentration camps that seemed unthinkable in 
modern Europe.”91 Furthermore, by mid-1993, the BSA was attacking designated 
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safe areas. This was a turning point for the UN, as it was now realized that its 
primary mission (providing security for the citizens of Bosnia) was failing.  
The UN decided to authorize the use of airpower. This authorization 
“established a ‘dual key’ arrangement between the U.N. and NATO in control of 
tactical air power” in response to the overwhelming attacks by Serbian forces.92 
Nonetheless, it was stated, “This arrangement proved difficult for Washington, as 
the U.N. was extremely reluctant to authorize any effective combat action on part 
of NATO.”93 However, despite this somewhat strained relationship between the 
UN and NATO, limited air strikes were carried out by the coalition. These air 
strikes were initially believed to be sufficient to bring Milosevic and his forces to 
the bargaining table. However, they had the opposite effect. By April of 1995, 
Milosevic and his forces held over 300 UN peacekeepers as hostages. It was 
documented that those taken as hostages were subsequently used as human 
shields, in an attempt to prevent the coalition from continuing its extensive air 
strikes against the Serbs. Ultimately, the UN stopped conducting air strikes in an 
attempt to save lives of the hostages. Yet, with the halting of air strikes, Milosevic 
continued his methodical assault against designated safe areas. By the spring of 
1995, these designated areas were once again being shelled, as heavy weapons 
continued to be moved back inside the mandated exclusion zone. The UN and 
could do little at this point due to the strict limitations mandated by UNSC 
Resolutions. As a result, the UN and NATO “agreed on the effective end of the 
‘dual key’ policy for controlling air strikes, with authority for strikes delegated to 
UNPROFOR and NATO commanders in the field. The Alliance further agreed 
that any future attacks on safe areas would result in a sustained air offensive.”94 
On August 28, 1995, the BSA shelled a UN-designated safe area. The 
circumstances surrounding these mortar attacks, and the staggering loss of life 
they caused, compelled NATO to take action. This was a well-defined trigger for 





NATO air operations, which had been previously established for the coalition by 
the ending of Resolution 743. Furthermore, the Sarajevo offensives were 
“portrayed in color on CNN worldwide,” and the allies held that “the compelling 
force of world public opinion” required decisive military force by NATO.95 On 
August 30, 1995, NATO began an historic air campaign that eventually brought 
Milosevic and his forces to the bargaining table. ODF was a distinctive NATO 
operation, in which airpower became NATO’s instrument of choice. The use of air 
power had a tremendous psychological, political, and strategic effect upon the 
outcome of the operation. Precision-guided munitions (including Tomahawks) 
were used throughout the operation in an effort to ensure maximum efficiency. 
This afforded NATO forces the opportunity to strive to strike only military targets. 
Targets such as radio relays, ammunition storage sites, early warning radars, 
supply depots, and other essential military facilities were destroyed. By mid-
September 1995, the combination of various types of NATO aircraft, together 
with the use of TLAMs, severely degraded Milosevic’s forces. It was estimated 
that the combination of the Alliance’s aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles was 
responsible for the destruction of a large number of Serbian military targets, and 
that a high proportion of the munitions used were precision guided. By the end of 
September 1995, both sides terminated all fighting. The effective use of airpower 
and precision airstrikes aided in bringing the Bosnia war to an end, and led 
ultimately to the Dayton Accords.  
ODF accomplished two major things. First and foremost, it showed that 
the NATO allies could act together effectively as a coalition. Additionally, it 
showed the need for NATO in the post-Cold War era. The decisive use of 
airpower, including precision airstrikes, played a critical role in support of Allied 
diplomacy. ODF provided future leaders an in-depth understanding of the use of 
airpower and its significance for future foreign policy. As noted in Chapter I, 
airpower served as “a decisive element in bringing a new period of peace to 
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Bosnia—quickly, cleanly, and at a minimal cost in blood and treasure to the 
intervening states and, indeed, to the Bosnian Serbs.”96 Additionally, the 
Alliance’s actions in Bosnia illuminated the importance of the political-military 
environment for future operations. As pointed out previously, despite the 
sometimes “tenuous” relationship between the UN and NATO, the Bosnia 
operations “highlighted the ability of separate political and military organizations 
to work together.”97 The successful use of airpower would within a few years 
again be central to the Alliance’s political-military mission. 
B. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (KOSOVO CAMPAIGN) 
In the late 1990s, NATO undertook another significant operation in the 
Balkans, Operation Allied Force (OAF). On March 24, 1999, after failed attempts 
to end the violence, repression, and violations of human rights ordered against 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by the elected president of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosevic, NATO conducted OAF by relying 
exclusively on air power. After seventy-eight days of NATO precision strikes 
upon many high-priority targets in the FRY, Milosevic agreed to pull his forces 
out of Kosovo and allowed the nearly one million displaced ethnic Albanians to 
return to their homes. Airpower provided a victory for NATO and demonstrated its 
ability to bring an adversary to the bargaining table. 
Nonetheless, to understand the reasons behind OAF and NATO’s 
exclusive use of airpower, one must look at the environment dating back to the 
Bosnian war. In 1992, war erupted in the former Yugoslavia. In an attempt to 
extend Serbian control, Serbian forces, under the orders of Milosevic, 
systematically brutalized Muslims and Croatians in Bosnia and Croatia. For over 
three years, fighting in Bosnia and Croatia raged on, leaving hundreds of 
thousands dead and over a million people displaced. In the case of Bosnia, the 
United States and its NATO allies held Milosevic responsible for these deaths 
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and displacements, and on August 30, 1995 initiated ODF to bring an end to this 
war. After concluding OAF, stability in Bosnia grew, whereas, in Kosovo in grew 
progressively less.  
By the fall of 1998, Milosevic returned to his previous policies. He ordered 
Serbian forces to attack all ethnic Albanian villages in the Serbian province of 
Kosovo. When diplomatic efforts stalled and the violence in Kosovo intensified, 
NATO refused to stand idle. The NATO Alliance decided to strike and 
commenced OAF on March 24, 1999 to prevent a repetition of the Bosnian 
tragedy. As stated by Benjamin S. Lambeth, OAF came to represent “the first 
extended use of military force by NATO, as well as the first major combat 
operation conducted for humanitarian objectives against a state committing 
atrocities within its own borders.”98 Employing only airpower, NATO commenced 
a multitude of precision strikes against carefully selected targets in the FRY. 
These precision strikes had three objectives; first, to demonstrate NATO’s 
opposition to this aggression and its support for peace; second, to deter 
president Milosevic from continuing his escalated attacks; and lastly, to damage 
the Serbian capacity to wage war against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in the 
future by seriously diminishing Serbian military capabilities.  
NATO member nations were unanimous in their desire to stop Milosevic; 
however, there were fundamental differences of opinion over exactly how 
NATO’s military power should be used against him. As noted previously, 
according to Wesley K. Clark, who served as Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe as well as the U.S. European Command Commander during Operation 
Allied Force, “The United States was increasingly committed to the idea of 
strategic strikes, going after the heart of Milosevic’s power. The Europeans, or at 
least the French and a few others, were more interested in limiting the strikes to 
Kosovo, trying to hit the ground forces, and avoiding actions that might 
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antagonize or damage Serbia further.”99 These fundamental differences 
stemmed in part from a “dichotomy between political aims and military 
means.”100 Furthermore, this discord among the Alliance’s leaders led to its 
failure to capitalize on NATO’s air power.101  
Accordingly, NATO decided to fight a limited war. The allies attacked only 
carefully selected targets in Serbia and Kosovo, employing the most accurate 
weapons (bombs and missiles) in their military arsenal. As stated by Anthony 
Cordesman, “the majority of direct attack weapons employed during Operation 
Allied Force were laser-guided bombs. In addition, long-range, stand-off 
munitions such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and the 
Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) were employed extensively, 
especially during the initial stages of the operation and in periods of adverse 
weather.”102 These weapons were launched from a variety of platforms by the 
United States and the United Kingdom: surface, subsurface, and air platforms for 
the United States and only subsurface platforms for the United Kingdom.103  
Partly because NATO had ruled out the use of ground forces in Kosovo, 
and chose to rely heavily on the use of airpower, the initial phases of OAF got off 
to a rocky start. NATO’s efforts to establish air superiority over Kosovo and 
suppress air-defense systems and communications capabilities throughout the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were hampered by the elements. Over half of 
NATO’s combat missions were canceled due to bad weather. This resulted in the 
employment of cruise missiles during the initial days of the campaign and during 
periods of adverse weather. During OAF, two NATO allies, the United States and 
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the United Kingdom, launched exactly 238 cruise missiles combined, including 
both TLAMs and CALCMs. However, the United States shouldered the 
responsibility for a significant number of the cruise missiles launched, due to its 
unique capabilities in all-weather precision strikes. It was estimated that the 
United States launched over ninety percent of the Tomahawks, hitting over eighty 
percent of their targets (181 of 218). Although the United Kingdom forces were 
limited in their participation, they were able to launch a total of twenty 
Tomahawks, likewise hitting over eighty percent of their targets (17 of 20). 104  
However, although these cruise missile strikes were undertaken in 
conjunction with manned aircraft operations, airpower did little to deter Milosevic 
from his series of brutal offensives. Meanwhile, aggression against ethnic 
Albanians continued to accelerate. Without troops on the ground, NATO could 
not establish safe havens for the citizens of Kosovo. Many became vulnerable to 
both atrocities at the hands of Serbian forces and accidental collateral damage 
from the NATO air strikes. The refugees who had safely escaped entered 
neighboring countries that were ill prepared to receive them. NATO’s exclusive 
reliance on airpower failed to stop the forced exodus of ethnic Albanians.  
Not until the last month of the operation did NATO finally see progress. 
During this time, NATO intensified its strikes against a new list of targets in 
Kosovo and Serbia, including such targets as water and power plants. This 
created a political climate conducive to major concessions. It caused worry in the 
regime over damage to “dual-use” infrastructures, and deepened fear of 
unconstrained bombing on Serbia if NATO’s terms were rejected. In Stephen T. 
Hosmer’s view, these factors “appear to have shaped Milosevic’s 
decisionmaking” in conceding in early June of 1999. 105 At the same time, Russia 
was beginning to press Milosevic into conceding to NATO’s demands. On June 
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10, 1999, Milosevic agreed to NATO’s demands, and pulled his forces out of 
Kosovo, allowing all ethnic Albanians to return to their homes.  
NATO leaders credited their exclusive reliance on airpower as the source 
of victory in OAF. The strategic portion of the seventy-eight day air campaign, 
which ended on June 9, 1999, played a crucial role in convincing Milosevic to 
“halt and reverse the human rights abuses that were being committed by armed 
Serbs against the ethnic Albanian majority living in Yugoslavia’s Serbian province 
of Kosovo.”106 Though every objective set out by NATO was achieved, other 
contributing factors should be taken into account in analyzing the reasons for 
NATO’s success in OAF, such as Russia’s contribution in bringing this conflict to 
an end and NATO’s threat of an invasion by ground troops.107  
OAF highlighted the major problems in relying exclusively on air power. As 
seen in OAF, air power alone was not enough to stop brutal attacks on the 
ground. NATO’s ruling out the use of ground forces in Kosovo at the outset was a 
grave tactical error. In the absence of NATO ground forces, Milosevic was able to 
use a variety of techniques to divert and deceive NATO war planners. This 
presented Milosevic’s forces ample opportunities to continue “ethnic cleansing” 
throughout Kosovo. In some ways, Milosevic was successful during the course of 
the war. He held the world’s strongest military Alliance (NATO) at bay, while his 
forces swept through Kosovo brutalizing ethnic Albanians. Unlike ODF, OAF 
showed that an exclusive reliance on airpower will not necessarily bring about a 
quick and decisive victory. Coming to grips with the limits of air power is vital to 
both political and military planners in future military operations. Nevertheless, 
“NATO demonstrated both the unwavering political cohesion and unmatched 
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military capability that will be required to overcome the complex and 
unpredictable security challenges of the 21st century.”108 Despite the many 
divisive pressures faced by the NATO allies, their determination and ability 
ultimately afforded a clear victory for OAF. 
C. OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR (LIBYA CAMPAIGN) 
Some observers hold that Operation Unified Protector (OUP) has left the 
NATO Alliance with a stylized template for future operations. As stated by 
Daalder and Stavridis in “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an 
Intervention,” OUP has “rightly been hailed as a model intervention.” 109 OUP is 
in a class of its own. In the words of Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., NATO “military 
action in Libya was a first in many ways—the Alliance’s first combat operation 
against an Arab country; the first time the United States ‘led from behind;’ and 
the first time the concept of Responsibility to Protect was applied to support 
Libya’s civilian population against a murderous regime.”110  
In early 2011, trouble was brewing in Libya, and again the United States 
and the NATO Alliance were compelled to take action. This time it was to impede 
and stop the terrorism being carried out by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and his 
military forces. The immediate roots of Libya’s crisis lie in the political upheavals 
associated with the Arab Spring, in which revolutionary waves of demonstrations 
and protests swept throughout the Arab world in the early months of 2011.111 
But, to understand the reasons behind the Arab Spring, one must look back to 
December 2010, when one man changed the Arab world.  
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On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Al Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, 
was selling fruit and vegetables from a cart as he did daily to provide for his 
family. Bouazizi, who was identified as operating an illegal business, had his 
means of livelihood (his cart) confiscated by a government official. The alleged 
reason behind the confiscation of his cart was that Bouazizi did not have a proper 
permit to sell. The circumstances surrounding this event are not entirely clear, 
but subsequently Bouazizi became outraged. A CNN report suggested that 
Bouazizi became outraged because a “police officer slapped him across his face” 
after the confiscation. Other reports hold that “Al Bouazizi tried to complain at a 
center for unemployed graduates—but that no one listened to him and he heard 
only laughter and insults.”112 Whatever the reasons might be, the following 
events sparked a worldwide revolution, a domino effect that swept through a host 
of other North African and Middle Eastern countries (e.g., Egypt, Djibouti, Ivory 
Coast, Libya, Mali). Bouazzi decided that he was not going to stand for this 
anymore, and immolated himself as a protest against the corrupt and oppressive 
government of Tunisia. His immolation incited a popular uprising, which became 
known as the Arab Spring. Enraged by this event, the citizens of Tunisia rose up 
against their oppressive government, staging waves of demonstrations and 
protests lasting for weeks and weeks. This revolution was so powerful that the 
Tunisian President, Ben Ali, decided to step down, ultimately ending his twenty-
three year reign. Though Bouazizi did not see this historic outcome, the 
revolution in Tunisia was successful. It provided the example that citizens of 
other oppressed countries followed. 
In February 2011, the election in Libya became volatile. As with every 
other country that participated in the Arab Spring, in Libya demonstrations and 
protests started spontaneously. Mohammed Ali Abdullah, a Libyan opposition 
figure, stated: 
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People have now been empowered to make a statement. Enough. 
Forty-two years of oppression. Forty-two years of a dictatorial 
totalitarian rule is enough. The source of the problem is the same 
person and it starts with getting rid of him, and that’s the common 
denominator that gets all the people to come out for these 
demonstrations.113 
However, these initial demonstrations and protests quickly became 
violent, as Gaddafi’s forces intensified their crackdown against the 
demonstrators. Gaddafi, determined to remain in power, was prepared to kill 
thousands of people, if necessary. According to Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. 
Williams, Gaddafi warned the “world that ‘officers have been deployed in all 
tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches’ 
and ‘any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed.”114 Furthermore, 
Gaddafi “vowed to fight to the death rather than leave Libya.”115 During the initial 
days of protest, it was estimated that Gaddafi’s forces killed 230 
demonstrators.116  
Throughout the next couple of months, violence would only intensify in 
Libya, causing grave concern for the United Nations. To aid the citizens of Libya, 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to approve two significant 
UNSC Resolutions: UNSCR 1970 and UNSCR 1973. 
UNSCR 1970 (February 26, 2011) referred the situation in Libya since 
February 15, 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
imposed an arms embargo on Libya, and established travel bans and asset 
freezes on key figures in the Qadhafi regime. UNSCR 1973 (March 17, 2011) 
authorized: 
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Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and 
acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all 
necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of 
any form on any part of Libyan territory.117 
UNSCR 1973 also called for a no-fly-zone, redefined the terms of the arms 
embargo, and extended the scope of the asset freeze.118 
For the first time in the UNSC’s history, the use of force for civilian 
protection “against the wishes of a functioning state” was authorized.119 As 
stated by Daniel F. Baltrusaitis and Mark E. Duckenfield, “The commitment of 
NATO to quell civil unrest in Libya in February 2011, and protect the civilian 
population from the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, ushered in a new era 
of NATO cooperation.”120 These actions were significant, because NATO was 
taking “all [the] necessary measures…to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attacks in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including 
Benghazi.”121  
In support of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973, on March 19, 2011, three 
key states in “the coalition of the willing,” France, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States took action, termed as Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD).122 From 
March 19 to March 31, these three NATO members employed precision strikes in 
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an effort to prevent a “humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to 
international peace and security by the crisis in Libya and for the purposes of 
preparing a no-fly zone.”123 Though it was declared a limited operation, U.S. 
military forces and capabilities were of paramount importance. As stated by Chris 
Pocock: 
It seems only the U.S. had the firepower to ensure that the 
essential first objective of suppressing Libyan air defenses was 
achieved. By the eighth day of the campaign, the U.S. had fired 184 
BGM-109s Tomahawk cruise missiles from ships and submarines 
against radars, surface-to-air missile sites and communications 
nodes. As for Libyan air bases, there was one attack by three 
American Northrop B-2s, flying a 24-hour round-robin mission from 
their home base in Missouri.124 
Though the initial strikes were mostly executed by the United States, OOD 
was able to quickly establish air superiority over Libya’s major cities. As stated by 
the President of the United States, Barack Obama: 
We’re succeeding in our mission. We’ve taken out Libya’s air 
defenses. Qaddafi’s forces are no longer advancing across Libya… 
So make no mistake, because we acted quickly, a humanitarian 
catastrophe has been avoided and the lives of countless civilians—
innocent men, women and children—have been saved… Our allies 
and partners are enforcing the no fly zone over Libya and the arms 
embargo at sea. Key Arab partners like Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates have committed aircraft. And as agreed this week, 
responsibility for this operation is being transferred from the United 
States to our NATO allies and partners.125 
In conjunction with the efforts of local rebels, OOD was seen by NATO 
commanders as an effective means to prevent acts of terror by Gaddafi and his 
forces. As the “coalition of the willing” conducted the first phases of the Libya 
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campaign, Gaddafi and his forces seemed headed for a quick defeat. However, 
this assumption turned out to be mistaken, as Gaddafi and his forces refused to 
accept NATO demands. These circumstances required NATO to expand the 
scope of its mission in Libya.  
On March 30, 2011, after two weeks of air operations under U.S. 
command, NATO took command and control over all military operations in Libya. 
For the first time in NATO operations the United States was now playing a 
supporting role, in which capabilities such as intelligence and logistical support 
were being provided. This new phase became known as Operation Unified 
Protector (OUP). Following OOD, OUP continued to operate at a high tempo, 
continuing to enforce the arms embargo and the no-fly zone, and to employ 
precision strikes against key targets. NATO and Gaddafi forces were locked in a 
battle until the death of Gaddafi on October 20, 2011. As proclaimed by the 
Obama administration, his death “marked ‘the start of a new era’ for the people of 
Libya.”126 Military actions by NATO ended in October 2011. 
However, the rapid escalation of the Libya campaign revealed divisions 
among NATO members. According to Baltrusaitis and Duckenfield, “the Libya 
operation spawned the most controversial diplomatic rift in the Alliance since the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, with the resistance of Germany and Turkey continuing to 
illustrate fundamental differences about NATO’s use of force.”127 Yet, despite 
these circumstances, OOD and OUP were successful due to the impact of NATO 
actions. The capability of airpower aided NATO in ensuring the achievement of 
the UNSC mandate, by preventing a humanitarian catastrophe, and thus 
protecting the citizens of Libya. Without airpower, the Alliance undertakings in 
Libya might have failed. The prompt actions taken by NATO saved the citizens of 
Libya from Gaddafi and his forces. The NATO allies and Partners achieved these 
objectives with minimal damage to their forces.  
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Yet, OOD and OUP exposed additional deep-rooted challenges (including 
excessive reliance on the United States and capability gaps within the Alliance) 
that have affected NATO since its inception. As pointed out by the NATO 
Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The operation has made visible 
that the Europeans lack a number of essential military capabilities.”128 During 
both operations, Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector, it 
was estimated that the United States launched over ninety percent of the 
Tomahawk cruise missiles, and provided over eighty percent of all air-refueling 
and reconnaissance flights. The majority of the remaining support came primarily 
from France and the United Kingdom. 
Without the assistance of the United States, clearly, Operation Unified 
Protector would not have been as successful as it was.  
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IV. THE CAPABILITIES GAP OF THE ALLIANCE 
In 1949, NATO was established as an “alliance organized to defend its 
members from external coercion or aggression and, on that basis, to conduct 
diplomacy with its adversaries to the East and seek a peaceful resolution to East-
West differences.”129 However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
geostrategic context for NATO transformed significantly, thus creating a new set 
of security threats (increases in ethnic conflicts, terrorist threats, nuclear 
proliferation, organized crime, etc.) and “concerns that diminished the immediacy 
of NATO’s two key functions as an alliance: the Article 5 collective defense 
obligation and the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee underwriting 
it.”130 For NATO to remain relevant, its members had to focus on its overall 
purpose of collective defense and contribute to collective security in the post-
Cold War world, in which several internal and external factors have transformed. 
While the Alliance remains a collective defense organization, today, allies have 
nonetheless assumed additional roles in cooperative security, conflict prevention, 
and crisis management.  
In all of the aforementioned operations, one thing has remained the same; 
the United States has played the dominant role. Excluding OUP, in which the 
United States was seen as “leading from behind,” all of the operations have 
depended on U.S. leadership. It can be said that, even within OUP, the United 
States did the majority of the “heavy lifting”: logistically, with aircraft fuelers; 
technologically, with precision-guided munitions and intelligence; and 
operationally, with combat power considering the proportion of U.S. sorties 
during the operation, especially in the initial phase. The conflicts in the Balkans  
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and Libya have revealed a major concern for the NATO Alliance, the operational 
capabilities gap between the United States and its NATO allies. As observed by 
the then NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson: 
The Kosovo air campaign demonstrated just how dependent the 
European Allies had become on U.S. military capabilities. From 
precision-guided weapons and all-weather aircraft to ground troops 
that can get to the crisis quickly and then stay there with adequate 
logistical support, the European Allies did not have enough of the 
right stuff…. Something is wrong and Europe knows it.131 
In this thesis, the operational capabilities gap is defined as a collection of 
many gaps, including timely availability, validated intelligence, deployability and 
mobility, effective engagement, command and control, logistic support, and 
survivability and force protection. 
 Timely availability includes high readiness, highly mobile and lethal 
forces, equipped and trained for covert and overt missions in 
complex terrain, such as special operations forces and mountain 
forces.  
 Validated intelligence includes strategic reconnaissance (satellites); 
signals intelligence; early warning and distant detection; target 
acquisition; battlefield intelligence and strategic reconnaissance; 
and Human Intelligence. 
 Deployability and mobility include air and sea lift capabilities; with 
an emphasis on wide body aircraft and Roll on/Roll off ships; and 
air-to-air refueling. 
 Effective engagement includes the following shortfalls: precision 
guided munitions; stand-off weaponry, including cruise missiles; 
and attack helicopters 
 Command and control involve the following deficiencies: secure 
and deployable C4 (Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers). 
 Logistic support involves tactical lift, notably transport helicopters; 
and tracking and tracing systems 
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 Survivability and force protection involves Suppression of Enemy 
Air Defenses; NBC protection and detection, and Combat Search 
and Rescue.132  
These essential operational capabilities provide the United States with a 
significant advantage, and the capability of projecting power “in the form of large-
scale long-range non-nuclear air and missile strikes at great distances from its 
homeland.”133 Additionally, of all the NATO allies, “only the United States can 
deploy hundreds of military aircraft far beyond its homeland and even transport 
the logistics to upgrade airfields with limited facilities.”134 The ability to forward 
deploy forces in a given proximity of a conflict or potential conflict has enabled 
the United States to play a dominant role in setting the agenda in NATO. 
However, at the same time, this “new dynamic in the transatlantic security 
relationship . . . makes the current imbalance between the U.S. and its allies 
unsustainable over the long run. Changing U.S. strategic interests, finite 
resources and a generational change are all making Washington’s political elite 
ever more skeptical about the value of the alliance.”135 
Some observers have argued that since the inception of NATO this 
capability gap has been a major concern for the alliance and that it has increased 
significantly between the United States and its NATO allies. In the words of 
Daniel S. Hamilton, “The U.S. and its allies have struggled for half a century with 
gaps in capabilities, questions of interoperability, and debates about burden-
sharing.”136 However, it seems that since the conclusion of OUP, there has been 
considerable discussion generated about the capabilities gap between the United 
States and its allies. Today, one must highlight a major weakness of the alliance, 
that is, the weakness of the alliance without United States military capabilities. 
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One must discuss the potential inadequacy of the Alliance to deal with future 
conflicts, small or big, without United States assistance. As stated by Robert 
Gates, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, “NATO had finally become a two-
tiered alliance divided between those few allies capable of engaging in high 
intensity combat missions and the overwhelming [of] members that can only 
contribute extensively to soft power non-combat oriented missions.”137 Likewise, 
according to David S. Yost, “the defence-capabilities gap that divides the United 
States from its European allies is real, and it matters.”138 Now it is time to 
confront this issue head on, using the most recent major operation as an 
example.  
For the first time in NATO’s history, the United States took on a supporting 
role during OUP, commonly referred to as the United States’ “leading from 
behind.” Initially, for the first couple of weeks, OUP was under the command of 
the United States, until the handing off of responsibility to two leading NATO 
European powers, France and the United Kingdom. Though the U.S. role was 
limited in OUP, the United States nonetheless provided an array of capabilities 
for its NATO allies, such as effective engagement (i.e., precision strikes), 
command and control, deployability and mobility (i.e., air-to-air refueling), and 
intelligence. Without the assistance of the United States, Operation Unified 
Protector would not have been as successful as it was. As Kori Schake has 
observed, “The [Libya] conflict would have taken longer, inflicted more civilian 
casualties and damage, taken more allied casualties, and been (as the British 
say) a much closer run thing.”139 From the beginning of the operation, to its 
eventual conclusion, these essential operational capabilities were instrumental 
for the NATO Alliance and provided a significant advantage during OUP.  
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However, the Libya campaign highlighted a number of disparities between 
the U.S. capabilities and those of its allies. As stated by Robert Gates, the then 
Secretary of Defense,  
…while every alliance member voted for the Libya mission, less 
than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been 
willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those 
allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to 
participate, but simply because they can’t. The military capabilities 
simply aren’t there.140 
Furthermore, OUP revealed the necessity of U.S. military capabilities 
within the alliance. This significant inadequacy of NATO capabilities raises 
several concerns for the alliance in the twentieth-first century. What if the United 
States chose not to participate in future NATO operations, as several other allies 
did in the Libya case? Is this a blueprint for the future? As the United States 
shifts its focus to the Asia-Pacific region, the capabilities requirement for its 
European allies will be significant. The NATO allies will eventually become 
responsible for protecting themselves and their own backyard. It is becoming 
paramount for the NATO alliance to decrease this military capability gap. If not, 
NATO will continue to be a two-tier alliance with nations having varying 
objectives, capabilities, and commitments. As stated by George Robertson, “it 
will be vital to avoid a two-tier Alliance, whereby, as a French observer once put 
it, the U.S. does the fighting and the Europeans do the dishes.”141 
Given that a limited number of NATO members have ownership of key 
capabilities, such as cruise missiles, early warning systems, etc., one must 
question the ability of the alliance and highlight the deep concerns in the event of 
the United States removing its security umbrella. As NATO continues to operate 
in its crisis management role, the capabilities gap within the alliance will have a 
serious effect upon its military efficiency and functionality. Moreover, it has been 
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argued, this gap will create a political division within the alliance, which has the 
potential to result in “distinctive U.S. and European views of foreign policy based 
upon their relative strengths and weakness” to deal with twenty-first century 
threats.142 NATO must transform its capabilities to be relevant for the challenges 
and potential threats of the twenty-first century. By analyzing the disparities seen 
from not only OUP, but also ODF and OAF, future leaders can plan accordingly 
to address the challenges of the twenty-first century. Additionally, by addressing 
this major weakness, NATO will be able to maintain its operational ability and 
remain effective in its additional roles of conflict prevention and crisis 
management. 
The chances of matching the United States in capability production and 
quality are slim to none, as the remaining members of the Alliance are ill 
equipped to take on this task. The United States is a major power with “the luxury 
of acting with the independence of a single country where a strong consensus 
exists on behalf of an assertive national security policy and a well-prepared 
military posture. By contrast, Europe is composed of many medium and small 
powers that must reach a widespread consensus in order to act collectively.”143 
Moreover, as operations become more robust, complex, and difficult, operations 
like OUP have demonstrated that the United States and its allies will continue to 
work together for the greater good.  
In this continuously changing world, the United States faces many threats 
and challenges. In saying that, one of the biggest threats is the emergence of the 
Asia-Pacific region, in which countries are now becoming more confident, better 
armed, and more determined to “play a greater role in controlling its future.”144 
Additionally, the Asia-Pacific region is growing rapidly in its military capabilities, 
nuclear developments, unresolved territorial and resource disputes, violent 
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extremism, natural disasters, proliferation, illicit trafficking and more.145 What 
does this mean for the United States? The new prominence of the Asia-Pacific 
has required the United States to reevaluate its policies and to develop new 
strategies to serve its interests and those of its allies. As the United States 
continues its pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, there stands a chance of increased 
tension within the Alliance and a risk of NATO operations being less effective in 
the future. Additionally, future NATO operations may require the Europeans to 
become the primary actor, whereas the United States may play a secondary role, 
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V. CRUISE MISSILE TRENDS 
The recent success of cruise missiles has caught the eye of the world, and 
as a result will present a challenge for NATO in the coming years. In the words of 
Sitakanta Mishra, “By all reckoning, the cruise missile has arrived on the world 
stage…Many nations have already mastered it and many more are striving for 
it.”146 What makes cruise missiles so appealing to governments around the world 
resides in two essential reasons: “their flexibility, which makes them useful for 
many purposes, and their comparatively low cost, which makes it possible to 
deploy them in great quantity.”147  
Today, cruise missiles are increasingly becoming a part of military 
arsenals worldwide. Once in the hands of a few selected countries (above all, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia), the success of cruise missiles is 
encouraging “a host of nations around the globe—including France, the United 
Arab Emirates, Germany, Sweden, Spain, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Taiwan, 
and Iran,” to develop their own generation of these weapons.148 Does this 
warrant trouble for the Alliance, when its potential adversaries are exploiting new 
technology as well? According to David Shukman,  
Technologies of a bewildering variety—from nuclear energy to 
miniature computers to robotics to biological engineering to space-
flight—are suddenly on the loose and the completion to find new 
ways of putting them to military use is no longer the preserve of the 
most advanced industrial nations. There is now a free-for-all to 
acquire weapons which may allow even relatively weak countries 
the chance to leap-frog their way to battlefield superiority.149 
                                            
146Sitakanta Mishra, “Evolution of the Cruise Missile Discourse: A Conceptual Construct,” 
Airpower Journal 4, no. 1, Spring 2009, 113. 
147Betts, Cruise Missiles and U.S. Policy, 9. 
148Ibid. 
149David Shukman, Tomorrow’s War: The Threat of High-Technology Weapons (Orlando: 
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1996), xiii.  
 60 
Andrew Feickert estimates that there are as many as 130 types of cruise 
missiles, with over 70 countries possessing them.150 Christopher Bolkcom and 
Sharon Squassoni estimate over 80 countries possess them.151 As many as 
70,000 cruise missiles are estimated to be operational. Below is a list of some of 
the NATO and non-NATO countries which are developing or have developed 
new generation land attack cruise missiles. 
A. RUSSIA 
Since 2007, Russia has been developing a new generation of hypersonic 
cruise missiles (3M51 Alfa, 3M-14AE, and Kh-101/102), with the capability of 
traveling long distances and striking either land or sea targets. It is estimated that 
these cruise missiles will be in service by 2020.152 
B. INDIA 
Over the last decade, India has been pursuing of its own land attack 
cruise missile. Similar to the U.S. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, India’s Nirbhay 
cruise missile is targeted to be ready for service by the end of 2014. As recently 
as March 2013, India was on track to meet its 2014 target date, but it was set 
back by an unsuccessful test launch.153 
C. IRAN 
Since 2012, Iran has been developing its own long-range cruise missile 
program. However, the status of this program remains unknown. According to the  
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Iranian Deputy Defense Minister and Head of Iran’s Aerospace Organization, 
General Mehdi Farahi, Iran’s cruise missile will have the ability to launch from 
sea, air, and land platforms.154 
D. TAIWAN 
According to Janes, Taiwan’s manufacture of a long-range, high-altitude, 
hypersonic cruise missile will commence soon. Little is known about this 
endeavor, but it is expected to be ready for introduction by 2015.155 
E. PAKISTAN  
As of 2013, Pakistan has two cruise missiles in service. First, Hatf 7 
(Babur) is similar to the Tomahawk; it is a ground-launched cruise missile 
designed to carry either nuclear or conventional payloads. It uses the same 
guidance applications (TERCOM and DSMAC) as the United States Tomahawk. 
Second, Haft 8 (Ra’ad) is an air-launched cruise missile capable of carrying a 
variety of different warheads.156 
F. GERMANY 
As noted previously, Germany pioneered the development of cruise 
missiles in World War II. However, since 2006, Germany and Sweden have 
collaborated in developing the Taurus KEPD 350, which features a two-stage 
warhead system designed to strike a variety of targets, including hard and deeply 
buried targets. In 2010, the production of this strategic weapon was terminated, 
as Germany seeks to develop a newer generation missile to keep up with the 
ever-changing technology and security environment.157 Capable of delivery from 
                                            
154Missile Threat, “Iran,” last accessed September 10, 2013, 
http://missilethreat.com/missiles/meshkat/?country=iran. 
155Janes, “Report Reveals Details of Taiwan's Mach 3 Cruise Missile.” 
156Missile Threat, “Pakistan,” last accessed September 10, 1013, 
http://missilethreat.com/missiles-of-the-world/?cruise 
157Janes, “Germany Takes Delivery of 600th Taurus KEPD 350 Missile.” 
 62 
a vertical launch system, this new generation missile will feature updated 
infrared-based target recognition and terminal navigation.158  
G. FRANCE 
On July 29, 2013, France successfully “carried out the first qualification 
firing of the MBDA Missile de Croisière Naval (MdCN) cruise missile.”159 In 
addition, it has been reported that France and the United Kingdom are working 
together to develop the “next-generation naval and land attack missile system,” 
which is estimated to be in service by 2025.160  
Over the past several decades, cruise missiles have improved quite 
rapidly. The cruise missiles of today are far more sophisticated than those in the 
past. These improvements have highlighted the potential trajectories for these 
strategic weapons for not only NATO, but also for many NATO adversaries. It is 
an open debate whether or not cruise missiles will in the future provide NATO a 
significant advantage over its adversaries, which leads us to question the end of 
warfare. Was Leonardo da Vinci correct in his belief that an “invention of some 
ultimate weapon would not only win battles but also might actually bring an end 
to warfare itself?”161  
Is NATO adequately prepared to defend against this threat? For nearly 
two decades, the NATO Alliance has for the most part enjoyed the exclusive use 
of cruise missiles. Nevertheless, the extent of this freedom is under serious 
challenge. This relatively cheap weapon that possesses the ability of displaying 
low radar and infrared signatures, coupled with its ability to travel with low-
altitude flight profiles, is difficult to detect and defeat.162 These fundamental  
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elements alone increase the chances of a cruise missile being “hidden by the 
curvature of the earth or behind hills during parts of the flight,” making it more 
difficult to stop.163  
These advantages have probably demonstrated to potential NATO 
adversaries the uniqueness of cruise missiles and the multitude of benefits that 
they offer. If NATO is to remain militarily strong, the allies must come to grips 
with this ever-changing security environment, and by revise their military and 
operational doctrine to deal with this foreseen threat. As foreign countries 
continue their push for these strategic weapons—the same weapons that have 
being used by NATO over the last two decades to prepare the battlefield, 
penetrate and suppress enemy air defense systems, and destroy key 
infrastructures—it is reasonable to say that adversaries could use these weapons 
against the Alliance and severely stress its defensive systems. According to 
Dennis Gormley, once cruise missiles become “widespread and [a] dominant 
feature of military operations in the twenty-first century, the strategic 
consequences for international security could be profound.”164  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has investigated the significance of airpower in NATO 
operations, particularly long-range precision-strike cruise missiles. Since its initial 
debut in the early 1990s, the modern cruise missile has continued to be a major 
driving force for NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention roles. 
Though employed in a limited fashion, cruise missiles have become a core 
competency for the NATO Alliance. The prime examples revealed by the 
aforementioned operations—Operation Deliberate Force, Operation Allied Force, 
and Operation Unified Protector—illustrate how the use of cruise missiles can 
achieve strategic goals, and bring an adversary to the bargaining table.  
The importance of cruise missiles for NATO is likely to persist. Cruise 
missiles have been employed considerably to assist in preparing the battlefield, 
without putting individual forces at risk. Additionally, cruise missiles, whether 
launched from a warship or a submarine, are able to travel long distances at very 
low altitudes and hit a precise target at any given time without being detected. As 
military establishments continue to cut back on forces, as economic woes 
continue for not only NATO, but also other nations, reliance upon these strategic 
weapons may nonetheless increase. 
This thesis has highlighted several issues affecting cruise missiles and the 
NATO Alliance. First and foremost, given the success of cruise missiles, it should 
not come as a surprise that these advanced weapons are not only the weapon of 
choice for NATO in certain types of contingencies, but also for militaries 
worldwide. The proliferation of cruise missiles should be of concern to the NATO 
Alliance, as many other countries are developing or have developed precision 
strike weaponry. The spread of these weapons could drastically increase 
regional threats and prevent challenges for international peace and security. The 
NATO allies must confront these significant challenges and revise their military 
and operational doctrine to deal with this foreseen threat.  
 66 
Lastly, the aforementioned operations have highlighted a growing 
capabilities gap between the United States and its European allies, which needs 
addressing immediately. Presently, NATO’s European members lack the many 
capabilities required to protect their own borders, which has in essence required 
them to rely heavily on the United States for support. Outside of the ability to 
employ TLAM cruise missiles (a capability of the United Kingdom alone in 
Europe), NATO’s European members lack other essential operational capabilities 
(validated intelligence, command and control, logistic support, etc.). If the gap is 
not addressed, NATO stands a realistic chance of not being successful in future 
operations without the support of the United States. The NATO European allies 
must take a greater share of the burden and shoulder a greater degree of 
responsibility for security in Europe.  
Despite these two major issues, there is no doubt that cruise missiles will 
continue to be an effective tool in NATO’s military arsenal. The aforementioned 
operations have vindicated the promise of cruise missiles, and have seemingly 
demonstrated the vital role that these weapons will play in the future. Though it 
may be considered unwise to predict the future, it is difficult to foresee NATO 
conducting future wars without employing cruise missiles. However, as the 
United States continues its pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. ability to 
provide additional capabilities to support NATO operations may become 
unavailable. The United States should therefore maintain its international 
partnerships and reorganize its military forces to assist its allies in future 
operations.  
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